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In Women's Choices, Mary Midgley and J u d i t h Hughes 
recommend that, i n assessing any given feminist theory, 
we dist inguish a m o n g questions concerning pr inciple , 
pol icy , and programme. T h i s is, we should ask whether 
the theory i n question is advocating a particular pr inc iple 
(an account of what social change should be brought 
about) or policy (an account of what social changes can be 
brought about) or programme (how such changes should 
be brought about). T h i s seems reasonable. It is n o use 
disposing of a feminist theory of a futuristic/ideal society 
o n the grounds that it does not provide us w i t h a detailed 
account of h o w to get there. Nevertheless, emphasizing the 
dist inct ion between policy, programme, and pr inc iple 
may lead us to ignore the fact that these are, to a significant 
degree, interrelated. Further, it blinds us to the fact that 
any given pr inc iple presupposes a descriptive account of 
the nature of the oppression of women. One must be able 
to perceive rape as oppressive to women before one can 
advocate, on feminist grounds, that it be abolished. One's 
theory or interpretation of the situation of women (the 
nature of their oppression) w i l l determine what changes 
one thinks ought to be made, as wel l as one's theory of 
what changes are possible. 
T h a t our interpretation of the nature of the oppression 
of women does determine our pr inc iple , pol icy, and pro-
gramme, is nowhere more apparent than i n Midgley and 
Hughes ' o w n wr i t ing . Midgley and Hughes attempt to 
purge feminist theory of its faulty premises by revealing 
the "false choices" w h i c h much feminist theory gives 
women. Unfortunately, the choices Midgley and Hughes 
come to regard as false are predetermined by their o w n 
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theory (set of assumptions and beliefs) about women and 
their " p r o p e r " place i n society. T h e i r theory is, i n turn, 
presented to the reader for acceptance on the grounds that 
alternative feminist theories offer us false choices. In short, 
Women's Choices embraces a very obvious petitio princi-
pii. In seems Midgley and Hughes are faced w i t h a serious 
phi losophica l problem of their o w n . 
T h r o u g h o u t Women's Choices, radical feminism sur-
faces as the brand of feminism w h i c h offers women the 
most false choices. Unfortunately, Midgley and Hughes 
ignore the fact there are several splits w i t h i n radical femi-
n ism, and, hence, there is no one brand of radical femi-
n ism; e.g., not a l l radical feminists are spiritualists or 
essentialists. In the f o l l o w i n g , I present one account of the 
radical feminist n o t i o n of the oppression of women, as 
developed most fu l ly by M a r i l y n Frye i n The Politics of 
Reality, and I address the criticisms of radical feminism 
advanced by Midgley and Hughes. 
Midgley and Hughes c l a i m that the radical feminist 
not ion of the oppression of women is far too broad. They 
offer a narrow not ion of oppression i n its stead. Midgley 
and Hughes define oppression as "abuse of p o w e r " (p. 
101). They offer this narrow def ini t ion i n place of a wider 
def in i t ion w h i c h w o u l d a l low that mere inequalities i n 
power are (sometimes) oppressive. T h e i r def ini t ion is nar-
row i n the sense that it a l lows only certain relations of 
power to be counted as oppressive, namely, those i n w h i c h 
power is abused. It is not clear what w i l l count as abuse on 
their account. In another sense, their def in i t ion is very 
wide because it enables vir tual ly any i n d i v i d u a l to be 
oppressive i n one respect or another. Radica l feminists 
p r o p o u n d a wide def ini t ion of oppression insofar as they 
c l a i m that all women are oppressed by virtue of being 
women (wi th in the context of patriarchy). T h i s def ini t ion 
impl ies that all men ( in a patriarchal society) are oppres-
sors, even those men w h o c l a i m to be sympathetic to 
feminism. T h e mere difference i n gender, w h i c h produces 
a difference i n power, is itself oppressive. 
Midgley and Hughes provide three reasons for consider-
i n g the adopt ion of the wider sense of the term to be i n 
poor judgment. First of a l l , the def in i t ion sounds exagger-
ated and is, therefore, l ike ly to " p u t off the unconverted." 
Secondly, this def in i t ion w o u l d i m p l y that a l l women are 
equal ly oppressed w h i c h w o u l d result i n blindness to the 
fact that many women are worse off (more oppressed) than 
others. A third reason is that it w o u l d l ikely foster a separa-
t ion between two distinct classes: the oppressed and 
oppressors. Midgley and Hughes regard such a dist inction 
as both counterproductive and false. They consider it 
counterproductive because women, even priveleged w o m -
en, w i l l assume that it is not their responsibility—because 
it is not i n their power—to alter patriarchal arrangements. 
T h e y consider it false, because some women, apparently, 
oppress some men, and hence 
There is not a sol id block of oppressors, a l l males 
and none of them themselves oppressed, si t t ing 
elsewhere and p r o f i t i n g by women's troubles, (p. 
103) 
If oppression is as wide and as deep as radical feminist 
c l a i m , then it is understandable that people w i l l f i n d this 
off-putt ing. Perhaps, the paralysis, w h i c h may result f rom 
the shock, disgust, or sheer disbelief people often undergo 
when presented w i t h the radical feminist perspective for 
the first time, w i l l subside once famil iar i ty w i t h the issues 
radical f eminism sees as central to the oppression of 
women is acquired. T h i n g s can seem less dismal once the 
depth of the problem is acknowledged and people com-
bine forces to overcome it. A t any rate, the c la im that a 
given theory is unattractive or that it complicates things, 
says noth ing as to the accuracy/truth of such a theory. 
Mora l i ty and justice should not turn on aesthetics or con-
venience, after a l l . 
T h e second and third reasons Midgley and Hughes put 
forth are m u c h more interesting, and m u c h more poten-
tially harmful to the radical feminist posit ion. There is, 
however, reason to believe that Midgley and Hughes are 
mistaken i n these claims. First, it is definitely true that 
many women are worse off than other women. T h i s is 
blatantly apparent when we consider those women w h o 
are physically beaten by their husbands, i n comparison to 
those women w h o are not; when we consider those women 
w h o have been the vict ims of incest and w h o have had to 
carry this burden i n silence, i n comparison to those 
women w h o have not. S imi lar ly , it is true that some 
women are more privileged i n our society; perhaps, by 
virtue of being white and/or wealthy, or by being con-
nected to a male who is white and/or wealthy. Midgley 
and Hughes c l a i m that not only w i l l these privileged 
women be less oppressed than other women, they may 
even contribute to the oppression of these other women. 
Further, such privileged women may even be viewed as the 
oppressors of (some) men. 
There is some truth to this. It is l ikely, however, that if a 
white/wealthy w o m a n is said to oppress some men—or to 
be thought to be superior to them—then she does so i n 
virtue of her white-ness or her wealth, and not her female-
ness. T h e oppression of women manifests itself i n differ-
ent ways and to varying degrees ( in the sense that some 
ways are more clearly brutally life-threatening), yet, this is 
consistent w i t h saying that a l l women are oppressed by the 
same thing, namely the patriarchal attitudes and values 
w h i c h justify certain practices towards women. Even a 
wealthy white w o m a n can be reduced to a pornographic 
object—directly or indirectly. Further, it is a fact that 
vict ims of incest, and of rape i n general, span a l l socioeco-
nomic classes. A poor Black woman is indeed worse off 
that a wealthy white woman. She is the v i c t i m of three 
forms of oppression. Her physical existence is threatened 
daily, and feminists need to address this immediately. A t 
the same time, feminists must be aware of the subtleties 
(depth) of the oppression of women and make certain that 
whi le tending to the more blatant cases we do not overlook 
those instances where women may seem, o n the surface, to 
be free when they, i n fact (perhaps w i t h respect to their 
psychological well-being) are not. T o say that a l l women 
are oppressed qua women, is not to say that the threat of 
rape results i n an experience or way of being w h i c h is 
qualitatively the same as that w h i c h results f rom actually 
being raped. It is to say that the ever-present threat of rape 
and any given actual rape are two manifestations of the 
same oppressive force. 
A broad def ini t ion of oppression w o u l d not cause us to 
overlook the fact that some women are beaten whereas 
others are not; these instances are just too brutal to be 
overlooked by any truly feminist consciousness. A narrow 
def ini t ion of oppression may result i n blindness to the fact 
that even privileged women are oppressed (their privilege 
serves to camouflage this fact). They are oppressed by the 
same root forces which oppress unprivi leged women. 
T h e third c l a i m w h i c h Midgley and Hughes make is 
related to the second one. T h e third c la im states that a wide 
def ini t ion w o u l d serve to (unjustifiably) compartmental-
ize women and men into two distinct camps: the oppressed 
(women) and the oppressors (men). T h i s clear-cut divis ion 
w o u l d discourage women f rom taking responsibil ity for 
change because they lack the power to make change. W i t h 
respect to the latter part of this c l a i m : to say that women 
generally do not h o l d positions of political/economic/so-
cial power is not to say that they do not have the power to 
affect political/economic/social arrangements. If feminist 
theory cannot convince women of this, then perhaps his-
tory can when one considers past revolutions of other 
oppressed groups who s imilar ly lacked such positions of 
power. W i t h respect to the former part of their third reason 
against adopt ing the wide def ini t ion of oppression: the 
c la im that a l l women are oppressed, that women consti-
tute a class distinct f rom the class of men, is far from being 
counterproductive—it is a prerequisite for feminist revo-
lu t ion , however one interprets " r e v o l u t i o n . " Emphasis on 
the p l ight of i n d i v i d u a l women, a long w i t h emphasis 
on the l ike l ihood that each w o m a n experiences her 
oppression differently (presumably because it is "hers") 
may have the impact of m a k i n g women believe they must 
fight their oppression on an i n d i v i d u a l basis—alone. T h i s 
may serve to lessen the l ike l ihood of ind iv idua l women 
succeeding i n d o i n g so. Strength, especially the emotional 
strength required here, does come i n numbers. It is di f f i -
cult to see what feminist theory can accomplish if it is not 
true that there are certain essential features of oppression 
c o m m o n to a l l women (which renders them a class). If 
there is not, then we w o u l d require as many theories of 
feminist revolutions as they are women. T h i s w o u l d be 
analogous to saying that—because a Black slave is al lowed 
(by a relatively decent master) to eat properly, bathe occa-
sionally, and sleep i n clean quarters, whi le another is 
beaten regularly and otherwise treated like an animal—we 
need two different theories of their oppression. However, 
the fact that both are rendered "s lave" by virtue of their 
sk in pigmentat ion and that both are slaves to white men, 
gives us sufficient reason to believe that both are oppressed 
by the same forces, and hence, one theory w i l l suffice. 
Midgley and Hughes further c l a i m that the l ine drawn 
between the oppressed (women) and the oppressors (men) 
is not so very distinct, and hence the c la im that there is 
such a d iv i s ion is false. It is false because some women 
oppress some men. Recal l my suggestion that women who 
can plausibly be said to oppress men, more than l ikely do 
so by virtue of their membership i n some other economic 
or racial class. M i d g e l y and Hughes , however, want to say 
that even w i t h i n a given economic or racial class, some 
women can be said to oppress some men. T h i s results from 
their narrow def ini t ion of oppression. Consider, 
Since people do not understand either themselves or 
each other very wel l , it is perfectly possible at this 
point , for both parties to be explo i t ing each other 
unconsciously, i n a violent and pa infu l see-saw. (p. 
104) 
What k i n d of exploitat ion are Midgley and Hughes speak-
i n g about here? T h i s passage draws to m i n d stereotypical 
images of the over-bearing wife w h o hen-pecks her hus-
band, or the manipulat ive w o m a n who marries for 
money. Certainly men do get harmed, their feelings are 
sometimes hurt and their egos wounded. As w e l l , it is not 
impossible that some women should use some men as 
merely a means to sexual pleasure. None of this indicates 
that men are oppressed as a class, even though i n d i v i d u a l 
men may lead lives made unpleasant by women. In order 
to determine whether men are oppressed by women, we 
need to consider the context i n w h i c h these actions occur. 
Context is crucial in any consideration of oppression. 
T h e concept of oppression warrants analysis. Just what 
do radical feminists mean by the oppression of women? 
M a r i l y n Frye, i n The Politics of Reality, provides the 
clearest account of oppression from a radical feminist 
perspective. Frye explains why being hurt is not sufficient 
to render one oppressed. Further, Frye reveals how "mere 
inequal i t ies , " whether i n economic status, sk in-pigmen-
tation, or gender, can be oppressive. Frye's argument w i t h 
respect to this is powerful and needs to be addressed by 
Midgley and Hughes and other feminists w h o share their 
view. Frye's account of oppression gives credence to the 
exaggerated c l a i m that a l l men oppress a l l women—even 
those men w h o Midgley and Hughes c l a i m are obviously 
not "tyrants p l o t t i n g to dominate" (p. 119) women. It is 
interesting that i n the quote above, Midgley and Hughes 
acknowledge that people can unconsciously oppress oth-
ers, so it is di f f icult to see how the absence of " p l o t t i n g " 
need tell anyth ing about either the presence or absence of 
oppression. 
Frye perceives oppression, i n general, to be: 
a network of systematically related barriers, no one 
of w h i c h w o u l d be the least hindrance. . .but w h i c h 
by their relations to each other, are as c o n f i n i n g as 
the sol id walls of a dungeon. ( M a r i l y n Frye, The 
Politics of Reality, p. 5) 
T h e key phrase is "systematically related barriers." 
Frye provides us w i t h a wonderful metaphor for barriers 
w h i c h are oppressive: the b ird cage. Clearly, the cage keeps 
humans out of the space w h i c h the b ird occupies, and it 
keeps the bird out of the space external to the cage. In this 
sense the cage is a network of barriers (of i n d i v i d u a l wires) 
to both the b i rd and those exist ing outside of the cage. It is 
on ly oppressive to the bird ; for it is obvious that it is the 
bird's freedom w h i c h is truly restricted. T h i s is analogous 
to the barriers imposed by patriarchy. T h i s system of 
barriers serves to keep women w i t h i n certain realms and 
out of certain other realms (of activity, thought, etc.). 
Occasional ly , men w i l l b u m p into these barries as wel l , 
and they may even be hurt by such barriers. For example, a 
m a n may l o n g to be a homemaker, and f i n d that society 
makes it di f f icult for h i m to do this without compromis-
i n g his " m a s c u l i n i t y . ' ' As such, his choices and actions are 
restricted. T h e fact that he runs into these barriers does not 
render h i m oppressed. O n the other hand, these barriers 
wh en viewed f rom the other side, when they make it 
d i f f i cu l t if not impossible for women to take o n typical ly 
" m a s c u l i n e " roles, do constitute oppression of women. 
A l t h o u g h the system of barriers restrict the actions of 
both w o m e n and men, that they are restrictive is not what 
renders them oppressive. Consider the obviously non-
oppressive restrictions on behaviour w h i c h comprise traf-
fic regulations, for instance. T o determine whether such 
barriers are oppressive, and to w h o m , we have to ask a 
series of questions about them. A s k i n g certain questions 
w i l l he lp one determine w h i c h side of the barrier one is o n 
(Frye, p . 12). One such question is " w h o constructs and 
maintains such barriers?" Another is "whose interests do 
such barriers serve?.'' Barriers such as sex role stereotyping 
may serve to keep men out of certain spheres, just as it 
serves to keep most w o m e n w i t h i n certain spheres. T h i s 
barrier works i n the interests of men. It a l lows men certain 
privileges: access to women, access to pol i t i ca l life. Some 
males, the well - intentioned ones, perhaps, may choose to 
deny themselves such privileges. Even so, this is indicat ion 
of the freedom of their part to make such a choice. If things 
go sour, they can always fal l back on such privilege. Even 
if they never do, this s t i l l renders them i n a pos i t ion of 
power over women, so l o n g as the rest of society embraces 
the patriarchal view that "maleness" is synonymous wi th 
" super ior i ty" and "powerfulness." 
If it is true that, by virtue of being male, certain humans 
acquire certain privileges, then it does make sense to say 
that men and w o m e n comprise two distinct classes. T h i s is 
to say that mere differences—mere inequalit ies—can be 
oppressive i n a given context. Yet, Midgley and Hughes 
disapprove of "the wholesale dismissal of a l l men as 
damned because of the faults committed by some of t h e m " 
(p. 97). If context is crucial , however, and if men can 
oppress s imply by virtue of being male i n a patriarchal 
society, then it is plausible that a l l men are " d a m n e d " to 
the status of oppressor. 
T h a t mere inequalit ies can be oppressive is perhaps 
more obvious when we consider mere economic inequal i -
ties w i t h i n the context of a capitalist society. If we live in a 
society w h i c h distributes goods according to one's abil i ty 
to pay for them, then clearly, the more money one has, the 
more goods one can buy. If a mi l l ionaire i n this society 
chooses to spend only the m i n i m u m amount of her/his 
cash reserve necessary to subsist—that person st i l l has 
more economic power than someone w h o can acquire 
on ly those m i n i m a l amounts of goods because of a lack of 
funds. Midgley and Hughes deny that mere inequalities 
are, i n themselves, oppressive. If by this they mean that 
one must consider the context i n w h i c h these inequalities 
occur before one can determine whether they are oppres-
sive, then they w i l l f ind substantial agreement among 
radical feminist theorists. T h a t context is essential to any 
interpretation of oppression is made very clear by Frye's 
analysis of oppression. G i v e n the context of patriarchy, it 
seems to be true almost by def ini t ion that differences i n 
gender contribute to the oppression of women. People 
often respond to this by saying that, if it is true by defini-
t ion that men oppress women w i t h i n patriarchy, then 
there is noth ing we can doabout it. They totally ignore the 
obvious, and correct, response that we should dispose of 
patriarchy. 
Frye stresses that those w h o are oppressed by a network 
of barriers share certain characteristics perceived to be 
" n a t u r a l " to them and w h i c h render them members of a 
class. T h u s , one is oppressed not as an i n d i v i d u a l (which 
Midgley and Hughes seem often to i m p l y ) but by "virtue 
of being a member of a group or category of people that is 
systematically reduced, molded, i m m o b i l i z e d " (Frye, p . 8). 
T h e barriers of patriarchy: sex-role stereotyping, stand-
ards of femininity, compulsory heterosexuality, do this i n 
a systematic way to women. A n y one of these institutions 
viewed i n isolat ion from the others can seem harmless, or 
at least not h a r m f u l to women as a class. After a l l , as 
mentioned above, not a l l women are battered. W h e n 
viewed i n context, and i n l ight of the bird-cage analogy, 
we can see h o w these institutions together constitute 
oppression of women. 
Given Frye's account of oppression, then, it seems we 
ought to be l o o k i n g for the various bars of the patriarchy 
cage and the way they are interrelated, if we are to under-
stand the nature of the oppression of women. Wife-
beating, sexist language, pornography, and the l ike, are 
each seen as a crucial strand/bar of the cage. It becomes 
plausible to view women as a class (wi th in the cage) and 
men as a class (on the exterior of the cage). As previously 
mentioned, Midgley and Hughes deny that there is such a 
clear-cut dist inct ion (p. 97 and p. 103) on the grounds that 
there are exceptions to the rule (a powerful woman, or an 
impotent man). Such exceptions apparently warrant the 
disposal of the entire theory on their view. In fact, these 
exceptions can themselves be explained by the theory. 
Radica l feminists w o u l d wonder if the w o m a n w h o takes 
sexual advantage of a m a n may be act ing i n self-defense. It 
may be her attempt at being the patriarchally defined 
"sexual ly l iberated" woman. It is possible that she— 
h a v i n g been vict imized herself—has had to adjust to the 
patriarchal view that sex should be distant or removed 
from other emotions associated w i t h love and commit-
ment of some sort. It may be that she could not beat such 
attitudes about sex, and has attempted to " j o i n " the tradi-
t ion. More importantly, Midgley and Hughes p r o p o u n d a 
view w h i c h implies that women (as a class) are not 
oppressed. T h i s means essentially that those indiv idua l 
women w h o somehow got a sk impy piece of the pie, were 
either s imply un luc ky or received such a por t ion because 
of factors of race or economic status: factors w h i c h have no 
relation to their being women at a l l . Insofar as Midgley 
and Hughes advocate this, they are perhaps best not 
referred to as " feminis ts . " They are more appropriately 
referred to as liberals or perhaps socialists. It is not clear 
w h i c h . Midgley and Hughes appeal to the pr inc ip le of 
fairness and a just dis tr ibut ion of benefits and burdens i n 
their a i m to rectify the situation of some/many women. In 
v i e w i n g oppression as the abuse of power, Midgley and 
Hughes are unable to account for the distr ibution of such 
power—pr ior to its abuse. T h a t is, they cannot expla in 
why some as opposed to others are i n a posi t ion of power 
i n the first place. One must be i n a pos i t ion of power 
before one can abuse it, obviously; nor can they exp la in 
why it is generally viewed as a good th ing to be i n a 
posi t ion of power, whether or not one abuses it. 
Further, the fact that Midgley and Hughes adopt a 
narrow account of oppression, a long w i t h their refusal to 
see the various institutions of patriarchy as institutions of 
patriarchy and, thereby, part of the systematic oppression 
of women, al lows them to say that rape, wife-beating, etc., 
a l though indisputably wrong, are "not part of a discus-
sion of normal problems...they are not the primary causes 
of discontent i n ordinary l i f e " (p. 127, my emphasis). For 
one th ing, the wrongness of such acts is disputable w i t h i n 
patriarchy. Consider, for instance, the myth surrounding 
rape. It is often assumed that women mean "yes" when 
they say " n o " ; that women f i n d pleasure i n their o w n pa in 
and mut i la t ion (and paradoxically, i n their o w n death!); 
and that women at the very least "deserve" to be raped 
("She went home w i t h h i m , didn' t she?" "That ' s what she 
gets for wearing tight pants!") . T h i s myth makes it dif f i -
cult to view women as victims of rape ("She loved i t ! " ) . 
Once you dispose of women's v ic t imhood, you leave the 
door open for rape being interpreted as an action between 
consenting adults. M a n y believe that this is sufficient to 
render any such act moral ly acceptable. 1 
What is truly a larming about the c l a i m w h i c h Midgley 
and Hughes make, is the ease i n w h i c h they c l a i m that 
these problems are not a part of " o r d i n a r y " life. It is not 
clear w h i c h women are " o r d i n a r y " here. It may be that 
M i d g l e y and Hughes s imply mean that many women, 
especially the privileged ones, do not have to worry about 
these things o n a day to day basis. T h i s is where M i d g l e y 
and Hughes are mistaken. A l l women are ordinary f rom 
the perspective of patriarchy. N o w o m a n is i m m u n e to its 
threats. Whether one fears w a l k i n g home alone at night, 
or whether one fears another beating f rom her husband, or 
whether one wonders how she can convince her husband 
to " l e t " her have a job, or whether one fears that one's 
views w i l l not be taken seriously by one's academic col-
leagues; these concerns and fears have their source i n a 
c o m m o n p o o l of attitudes and customs w h i c h are oppres-
sive to women. In the words of Frye: 
Be ing a w o m a n is... what selects me as a l ikely v ic t im 
of sexual assault or harassment.... For any w o m a n of 
any race or economic class, being a w o m a n is signif-
icantly attached to whatever disadvantages and dep-
rivations she suffers, be they great or smal l . 
N o n e of this is the case w i t h respect to a person's 
being a man. S imply being a m a n is not what stands 
between h i m and a better job.. . . Be ing male is some-
t h i n g he has g o i n g F O R h i m , even if race or class or 
age or disabi l i ty is g o i n g against h i m . (Frye, p . 18) 
T h e failure on the part of Midgley and Hughes to see this 
s imple fact a l lows them to deny the significance of actions 
w h i c h lie at the opposite end of the spectrum of actual 
rape: wolf whistles, m i l d forms of sexual harassment, and 
so on . They advise women to stop being "paranoid ' ' (p. 150) 
for " m i l d cases of anyth ing are m i l d " (p. 149). However, 
such m i l d cases are not harmless. T h e y are indicative of 
the underlying, deep system of value w h i c h fosters certain 
attitudes towards women and these attitudes are the very 
ones w h i c h give rise to the more brutal forms of oppres-
s ion. T h e message of a wolf whistle is that a w o m a n is her 
body and that she is some T H I N G to be consumed by 
men. It is a reminder of her perceived inferiority. That is 
harmful . 
That such experiences (fear of rape, being whistled at) 
are experiences w h i c h ordinary women undergo i n ordi-
nary life leads radical feminists to believe that a l l women 
have a great deal i n c o m m o n . They w i l l have certain 
experiences purely because they are women l i v i n g i n a 
misogynist society. 2 Such experiences range from the more 
blatantly cul tura l ones (of wife-beating) to seemingly 
" p u r e l y b i o l o g i c a l " ones (of awareness of oneself as a 
reproductive being). There is no doubt that the mere pro-
cess of menstruation raises concerns for women w h i c h 
men do not have. However, I believe it is cultural factors 
w h i c h make these concerns oppressive, and to that extent 
they can be altered. A t this point , let me s imply reiterate 
that women do have many things i n c o m m o n , i n c l u d i n g 
perspectives on life , w h i c h are significant and w h i c h are, 
to some degree, both a result of and a contributor to their 
oppression. Midgley and Hughes want to discredit this 
c l a i m by emphasizing that different women experience 
their oppression differently, especially those women w h o 
are oppressed by virtue of their race and/or their economic 
status. Midgley and Hughes do seem to acknowledge at 
least some nontr ivia l commonali t ies a m o n g women. For 
example, 
women do tend to f i n d total disengagement harder, 
just as men f i n d it harder to accept bonds. Even if 
this difference were produced only by culture (which 
it pretty certainly is not), it s t i l l poses a problem, (p. 
140) 
Indeed, as one reads M i d g l e y and Hughes ' book, it appears 
that a l l sorts of commonali t ies , serious ones, exist a m o n g 
w o m e n (pp. 112, 133, 198, 201-202, 208, and 209). In their 
very discussion of the choices presented to women and 
their contention that many of these choices reflect false 
dichotomies w h i c h lead w o m e n to confusion, they must 
assume that women undergo the same (where "same" 
means " s i m i l a r " and not " ident ica l " ) sorts of experiences. 
If they do not assume this, then the m a i n premise of their 
book falls through: that there is a "woman's point of 
v i e w " (pp.39-40) and that this, a m o n g other things, ren-
ders women essentially different from men. T h i s is the 
crucia l premise i n their argument that the concept of 
" equa l i ty " w i l l not serve the feminist cause well . Further, 
M i d g l e y and H u g h e s tell us that w o m e n and men differ 
essentially i n character and that this results i n a "universal 
d i v i s i o n of men and w o m e n into separate groups, w i t h 
distinct social roles" (p. 208). T h i s seems to be inconsistent 
w i t h their previous statement that there was no such clear-
cut d iv is ion between w o m e n and men. Midgley and 
Hughes justify their posi t ion by merely st ipulat ing that 
this d iv is ion cannot be viewed as " a case of the strong 
oppressing the weak, because that can be done without 
any div is ion of roles at a l l " (p. 208). It is true that men 
c o u l d s imply keep w o m e n l i teral ly i n chains, but that 
w o u l d be inconvenient. It w o u l d be more efficacious to 
convince women (via the various systematically intercon-
nected institutions of the b ird cage) that certain roles (of 
servitude) are natural to them, that they f i l l such roles wel l , 
and to reward them i n some way (by c a l l i n g them " v i r t u -
o u s " perhaps) for c o m p l y i n g w i t h them. T h a t way, revo-
l u t i o n is less l ikely to be a problem. Dominance can be 
manifested i n numerous ways. It is l ikely that h u m a n 
male dominance is sustained by cultural forces. We need 
not look for similarities among h u m a n behaviour and the 
barr ing of the baboon's teeth or the mat ing habits of apes, 
a l though male humans have been k n o w n to resort to these 
tactics when "reasoning" has failed. 
In summation, I think Midgley and Hughes ' o w n 
account of the oppression of women is inconsistent w i t h 
one of the m a i n premises/themes of their book: that there 
is a woman's point of view and that women are fundamen-
tally different f rom men. I th ink that it is unfortunate that 
they have misrepresented the account of women's oppres-
sion forwarded by many radical feminists, as it is precisely 
this account w h i c h could lend support to this m a i n theme 
of their book. 
1. It is interesting to note that the myth surrounding rape keeps 
company with other notions of patriarchal ideology such as "one 
ought not hit a lady." Are these notions inconsistent? Some femi-
nists believe that patriarchy conveys mixed messages which serve to 
keep everyone in a state of confusion and which, in turn, serves to 
sustain patriarchy. I do not believe the message is at all mixed. 
Consider, for instance, that rapists and child molesters are often 
roughed up—and sometimes killed—by their prison mates. One 
might think that this would indicate a repulsion on the part of these 
other prisoners towards the rapist or child molester because his act 
has shown a disrespect for a woman's or child's "person." It is 
equally plausible that the repugnance these prisoners have toward 
the rapist or child molester arises from a sense of betrayal to the 
masculine conception of the "ideal" criminal. One ought not to beat 
on women and children, not because they are persons worthy of 
respect, because they are easy targets. A real criminal (man?) would 
"pick on someone his own size." It is also plausible to view violence, 
from other prisoners directed as rapists and child molesters, as a 
battle over property rights. Women and children have tradition-
ally been viewed as the property of men. The notion that one 
ought not beat on women and children because they are (only) 
women and children (as opposed to the notion that one ought not 
beat on anyone) is a prime example of the "phallic" morality which 
fuels patriarchy. 
2. Not all experiences which women have in common will be relevant 
to a radical feminist political analysis of the plight of women. For 
instance, it is true that the menstrual cycle is in synchronization with 
the cycle of the moon. This obvious link with nature is truly a 
wonderful fact and it does render women "unique." But this expe-
rience has political repercussions in only this minimal sense. It does 
not, as some may think, render women superior to men just as it 
should not (although in fact under patriarchy it does) serve to render 
women inferior to men. Removed from the context of patriarchy this 
fact is in itself neither politically significant nor insignificant. 
Social context is crucial in determining whether a given fact is either 
oppressive or liberating. The extent to which menstruation, a com-
mon experience among women, is a concern for feminist political 
thought is that under patriarchy menstruation has been viewed as a 
curse, a disease, and otherwise taboo, and consequently, makes life 
difficult for women. 
I wish to thank Susan Sherwin for her comments on an earlier 
version of this review. 
